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This  article  explores  the  manipulation  of  published  financial  reports  in  order  to 
counter the potentially unfavourable impact of newly introduced regulation.  In this 
case the reported capital ratio of a major building society was enhanced using a sale 
and leaseback transaction with a related party and a change in depreciation policy, 
methods which reflected limited alternatives.  Analysis of the case is set in the context 
of  the  mid-term  performance  of  the  building  society  sector  and  addresses  the 
questions  of  whether  the  manipulations  involved  were  within  then-prevailing 
generally accepted accounting principles and why, despite disclosure in the society‟s 
financial statements, these failed to  attract  public comment  or concern,  regulatory 
action  or  an  audit  qualification.  In  examining  a  major  British  mutual  financial 
organisation  we  depart  from  traditional  analyses  of  managerial  discretion  in 
accounting choices in manufacturing, mining and transport companies prior to the 
watershed Companies Act 1948.  
Key words: Accounting manipulation; Creative accounting; Sale and leaseback; 
Depreciation; Building societies; United Kingdom.   3 
 This  article  investigates  the  response  of  a  U.K.  financial  intermediary  when 
regulatory change threatened to curtail its growth opportunities. The evolving inter-
relationships between strategic decision-making, regulation and accounting practices 
are central to our analysis of this case.  The key explanation of how and why those 
practices emerged in their historical context is managerial concern about the effects of 
changed  regulatory  requirements  on  stakeholder  evaluation  of  the  entity‟s 
performance. 
Building societies  are mutual  organizations,  owned by their members who are 
their  customers  -  borrowers  and  depositors  with  ownership  rights  -  described  as 
„shareholders‟.  There  were  819  societies  in  1950,  although  10  per  cent  of  these 
accounted for about 50 per cent of the total assets of the „movement‟ (i.e. the building 
society sector).   Among the large societies, a handful had transformed themselves 
from the typical small and local organizations into large national ones.  This paper 
focuses on one such society, the Co-operative Permanent Building Society (hereafter 
the CPBS or the Society), whose rapid growth was driven both by amalgamations 
with other societies and organic growth.  By the end of the 1950s this growth had left 
the  CPBS  with  a  strategic  problem:  a  weakened  capital  position  when  explicit 
statutory capital and liquidity requirements were first imposed on societies, which had 
finally won a long-running argument that trustees should be allowed to invest in their 
deposits. 
The paper  addresses the question of how the CPBS, from  an unpromising 
position, secured compliance with this new regulation when failure to meet the new 
capital  requirements  might  have  threatened  the  Society‟s  status.    There  are  two 
aspects to our discussion: the creative accounting solutions used and the acquiescence 
of various stakeholder groups in their use. The CPBS entered into transactions which   4 
may be regarded as „creative accounting‟ in that they appeared to comply with the 
relevant regulation and prevailing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), 
but had a material positive impact on the Society‟s reported financial position.  The 
aggregate effect of these changes was clearly disclosed in the financial statements but 
failed to attract public comment from the auditors, the regulator, other societies or the 
press. 
This article constitutes a compelling story for several reasons. First, we focus on 
one large institution, providing a rich account of the business strategy and operations 
typical of a large society.  Little has been written about the business and accounting 
history of individual building societies, although the twentieth century history and 
performance of the building society movement in transforming retail deposits and 
„share‟ investments into long-term mortgage financing for domestic house purchases 
has  been  well-documented  (see,  e.g.,  Davies,  1981;  Boléat,  1986;  McKillop  and 
Ferguson, 1993; Jeremy, 1998; Bátiz-Lazo, 2004).   
Second,  this  article  examines  an  otherwise  neglected  area  in  the  history  of 
financial  reporting,  providing  a  detailed  case  study  of  „creative  accounting‟  in  an 
industry and period not known for manipulative activity, and in an organization which 
survived  and  was  not  subject  to  investigation.    Stolowy  and  Breton  (2004,  p.  6) 
describe „creative accounting‟ as a journalistic term that represents the exercise of 
management‟s discretion to make accounting choices or design transactions so as to 
modify apparent performance and enable transfers between the company and society 
(political costs), fund providers (cost of capital) or managers (compensation plans). 
The potential impact of these transactions will depend on the market context (Stolowy 
and Breton, 2004, p. 10). Much of the extant work on „creative accounting‟ in Britain 
focuses on manufacturing, transport and mining companies and generally examines   5 
time periods before the „watershed‟ Companies Act 1948 (CA48) (e.g., Napier, 1990, 
1991; Arnold, 1991).  Such studies pay close attention to the links between improved 
disclosure,  fixed  asset  accounting,  inner  or  secret  reserve  accounting  and  „profit 
smoothing‟, and help to legitimize the rationale for the major changes in financial 
reporting requirements in CA48 (Arnold, 1997; Maltby, 2000). Arnold and Matthews 
(2002) and Arnold  and  Collier (2007) have demonstrated the impact  of CA48 on 
corporate financial reporting.  Banks, together with certain other types of company, 
enjoyed  significant  exemptions  from  this  Act,  with  considerable  impact  on  their 
financial reporting (Billings and Capie, 2009).  But building societies, outside the 
scope of CA48 as mutual organizations, have not been subject to similar examination 
and had less opportunity to hold „hidden reserves‟.  Indeed, the CPBS case is unusual 
in that the accounting manipulations were clearly reflected in the Society‟s published 
financial statements, but failed to arouse public interest. 
Third, this article responds to the call by Stolowy and Breton (2004, p. 29) for 
more  research  on  the  motivations  for  manipulating  accounts.    We  argue  that  the 
motivation in this instance was the desire to avoid an adverse regulatory outcome.  
The case can therefore also be placed in the context of the so-called „bond covenant 
hypothesis‟ (Clinch, 1983, p. 141), whereby managers will wish to avoid the costs of 
violating  restrictions,  in  this  instance,  the  possible  loss  of  a  particular  regulatory 
status. 
The article proceeds as follows.  The next section explains financial reporting 
and regulatory requirements for building societies and how these changed in 1959 and 
1960.    We  then  briefly  describe  the  history  of  the  CPBS  and  detail  the  business 
environment in which large building societies operated at the end of the 1950s.  The 
next  section  shows  how  the  CPBS  responded  to  changes  in  the  regulatory  and   6 
business  environment.    The  penultimate  section  discusses  this  response  and  the 
position  of  various  stakeholder  groups:  other  societies;  the  regulator;  the  CPBS‟s 
directors; and its auditors.  The final section concludes. 
 
THE CHANGING REGULATION OF BUILDING SOCIETIES 
 
The Housing and House Purchase Act 1959 
The Building Societies  Act  1894 (BSA94)  gave  powers to  the Chief  Registrar of 
Friendly Societies (CRFS) to intervene in the affairs of societies and required full 
accounting  disclosure  and  professional  audits  (Phillips,  1983,  p.  4).  Although 
subsequently amended, notably in the Building Societies Act 1940, BSA94 remained 
the main statute regulating U.K. societies until changes introduced in 1959 and 1960. 
Following  the  enactment  of  the  Housing  and  House  Purchase  Act  1959 
(HHPA59),  societies  gained  two  forms  of  government  recognition:  „their  deposits 
became authorized trustee investments and building societies became entitled, for the 
first  time  in  their  long  history,  to  borrow  from  H.  M.  Government‟.
1    A  1954 
voluntary  agreement  had  channelled   £100  million  from  government  through  the 
societies to promote home ownership, but disadvantaged borrowers who wanted to 
buy a house built before 1919 (Registry of Friendly Societies (RFS), 1961, pp. 13-14; 
RFS, 1962, p. 357; Cleary, 1965; Boddy, 1980, pp. 17-19; Boléat, 1981, p. 153).
2   To 
continue  to  „help  people  with  moderate  incomes  …  to  fulfil  their  ambition  of 
becoming home-owners‟,
3 the government proposed making further advances through   7 
societies, which agreed to take on the business in return for the designation of their 
deposits as suitable for investment by trustees.
4 
„Trustee investment status‟ was first sought by societies for investments in 
their „shares‟ and deposits in the mid-1920s (Humphries, 1987, p. 335).  Without it, 
trustees,  including  executors  of  estates  of  the  deceased,  were  unable  to  invest  in 
building societies in the absence of specific directions. Societies believed that this 
status would give them a competitive advantage and increase their loanable resources
5 
but it rapidly turned into „a seal of respectability … and all but a very few societies 
eligible for have sought and obtained such status‟ (Boléat, 1981, p. 32).  Designated 
status had been achieved by 218 of the 732 registered societies in December 1960, 
whose  assets  of  £2,994  million  comprised  94  per  cent  of  the  total  assets  of  all 
registered societies (RFS, 1961, p. 6). By December 1961 there were 255 designated 
societies,  whose  assets  totalled  £3,274  million,  95.3  per  cent  of  the  assets  of  all 
registered societies (RFS, 1962, p. 5).  
    Initial qualification for, or revocation of, trustee investment status was at the 
discretion  of  the  CRFS  (RFS,  1961,  p.  7),  with  no  requirement  for  automatic 
revocation when a society ceased to fulfil the requirements of the HHPA59.  A later 
Statutory Instrument required that a society should have a minimum net reserve ratio 
(of 2.5 per cent of net assets at the end of 1960) and a minimum liquidity requirement 
(of 7.5 per cent of total assets at the end of 1960) to be granted this status (S.I. 1959 
No. 1010).  The Building Societies Association (BSA), the voluntary industry body, 
adopted these same requirements as a condition for renewal of membership, but did 
not require compliance until 1965, to allow smaller and less liquid societies time to 
meet them. The BSA‟s move was intended to give „… the public the same guarantee   8 
of security in the case of deposits and investments in smaller societies, [as] trustee 
status gave to the larger societies‟ (Cleary, 1965, p. 268). 
Meeting the liquidity requirement was straightforward for most societies - for 
the sector as a whole cash and investments had exceeded 14 per cent of total assets for 
every year since 1945 (Cleary, 1965, p. 256) and were to remain above 15 per cent 
until at least 1973 (Greer, 1974, p. 11).  The „normal‟ range for liquidity ratios for 
individual societies within any one year was between 12 and 22 per cent (Perks, 1977, 
p. 62).  Meeting the reserve requirement, however, was more challenging.  Just as 
capital  adequacy  sustains  confidence  in  banks,  building  societies  need  reserves  to 
provide against various contingencies to maintain investor confidence: losses on the 
sale of mortgaged properties following borrower default; losses on the realization of 
investments in (mainly fixed income) securities; and to guard against the unknown.
6  
Before the HHPA59, the BSA had long recommended that every society should aim 
for „gross‟ (i.e. a less strictly defined level of) reserves of at least 5 per cent of total 
assets. In 1938 the average figure for all societies was 5.5 per cent and had fallen to 
4.5 per cent by 1957, but this „decline in the [gross] reserve ratio was not in itself 
regarded  as  serious‟  by  the  BSA.
7  The  average  gross  reserve  ratio  for  the  major 
societies had dropped from 5.0 per cent in 1950 to 3.8 per cent in 1959 (Table 1, 
Panel A).   
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
In 1959 Sir Cecil Crabbe, CRFS, noted that some societies had increased their 
general reserves by abandoning the practice of making provisions for future liabilities.  
He  also  noted  that  some  societies  had  revalued  their  office  premises  to  increase 
general  reserves,  but  such  revaluations  were  disregarded  in  the  assessment  for   9 
designation, unless the society intended to realize the higher value in the foreseeable 
future (RFS, 1960, p. 8). 
The Building Societies Act 1960  
The  collapse  of  the  State  Building  Society  in  September  1959  hastened 
enhanced  disclosure  requirements  in  the  Building  Societies  Act  1960  (BSA60) 
(Noguchi and Bátiz-Lazo, 2009).
8 These requirements, although expressed in general 
terms, made the BSA60 more prescriptive than the CA48.  But there was still ample 
room for society directors and auditors to interpret whether certain accounting choices 
represented  „fair  presentation‟.  There  was,  for  instance,  no  specific  guideline  on 
depreciation, but disclosure was required of „… the method of arriving at the amount 
at which any office premises were shown in the society‟s Annual Return‟ (the Form 
A.R. 11).
9 
The BSA60 also changed  the audit objective in respect of building societies 
from „fraud detection‟ to „statement verification‟, with auditors required to comment 
on  whether  the  financial  statements  presented  „a  true  and  fair  view‟.    This  shift 
aligned the treatment of societies with that of corporate bodies under the CA48 and  
was the culmination of a long process.  In the late nineteenth century building society 
fraud had been an important factor in the change of the primary audit objective in 
England from „statement verification‟ to „fraud detection‟ (Kitchen and Parker, 1980, 
p. 55; Chandler et al., 1993, p. 446).  But in the late 1920s, and especially the 1930s, 
opinion shifted to  place greater emphasis on „statement  verification‟  and this  was 
reflected in the CA48 (Chandler et al., 1993, p. 452). The BSA60 also represented the 
first legislation to introduce the auditors‟ duty to report on internal control, preceding 
similar requirements in, for example, Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.   10 
The financial statements of building societies from 1960 onwards were thus drafted 
under a different regime to those of 1959 and earlier. Whilst the BSA60 constituted a 
major piece of legislation for building societies, it also marked a key success for the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) which had made 
lengthy representations on behalf of its members to secure changes in building society 
audit requirements (Noguchi and Bátiz-Lazo, 2009). 
Other Accounting and Auditing Requirements 
Accountants readily accept that accounting principles allow scope for interpretation, 
but „[t]o be legal, interpretations may be in keeping with the spirit of the [accounting] 
standard or, at the other extreme, clearly stretch that spirit while remaining within the 
letter of the law‟  (Stolowy  and Breton, 2004, p. 11).   In the absence  of codified 
GAAP,  historians  of  „creative  accounting‟  compare  and  contrast  transactions  in  a 
particular organization with practices in similar organizations in order to determine 
whether  a  group  of  transactions  should  be  considered  as  „fair  presentation‟, 
manipulation or fraud (e.g., Arnold, 1991). 
A number of sources other than legislation could have impacted on the practices 
of building societies.  The  ICAEW‟s Taxation and Financial  Relations Committee, 
formed  in  1942,  issued  „Recommendations  on  Accounting  Principles‟.    The  new 
building  societies  legislation,  and  its  role  in  it,  led  the  ICAEW  to  issue  its  first 
auditing  publication,  a  booklet  entitled  „Audits  of  Building  Societies‟  (ICAEW, 
1960).  This was concerned mainly with the system of internal control and verification 
of  mortgage  advances.    Guidance  on  „window  dressing‟  addressed  liquidity,  not 
capital, and specific guidance on fixed assets and capital was lacking.   11 
Another non-legislative source was the BSA‟s „Financial Accounting Procedures‟. 
These guidelines explicitly recognized that there were wide differences in accounting 
policies behind the apparent simplicity and uniformity in the financial statements of 
building societies. The „Procedures‟ considered „source[s] of great variability between 
building societies‟, such as labour costs within „Total Management Expenses‟,
10 but 
did not address the depreciation of fixed assets. 
  The  BSA60‟s  statutory  instruments  left  largely  unaffected  the  choice  of 
accounting policies by individual societies, and the ICAEW‟s Recommendations and 
audit guidance, and the BSA‟s „Financial Procedures‟ offered room for interpretation 
in  areas  such  as  the  depreciation  of  fixed  assets.    This  apparent  latitude  created 
opportunities for creative accounting at the CPBS.  The next section sets out a brief 
history of the CPBS and discusses the growth in assets of the largest building societies 
to establish the need for creative accounting at the CPBS. 
 
THE CO-OPERATIVE PERMANENT BUILDING SOCIETY 
 
Brief Business History 
The CPBS (today  Nationwide) was  born  as  the Southern Co-operative  Permanent 
Building Society in  February 1884. The „Southern‟ prefix was removed ten  years 
later.  This  London-based  society  was  formed  to  enable  depositors,  particularly 
members of the co-operative movement, to buy their own homes (Ashworth, 1980, p. 
15; Cassell, 1984, p. 13). The Co-operative Congress, however, refused to give full 
backing to another financial institution developing alongside the banking arm of the 
Co-operative Wholesale Society (the CWS Bank - see Bátiz-Lazo, 2004; 2006), but   12 
many leading and rank and file members of the co-operative movement joined the 
CPBS and some became its agents, either personally or through their retail societies.  
The  CPBS  also  sought  business  elsewhere,  notably  amongst  railway  employees 
(Cassell, 1984, pp.  24-5). 
Mortgage advances of the CPBS and other building societies surged in the 
1920s and accelerated further during the 1930s (Humphries, 1987). This growth was 
accompanied by the emergence and increase in the numbers of both agency contracts 
and retail branches.
11  By 1950 the combination of government policy antagonistic to 
private home ownership, the mortgage rate cartel,
12 together with inflation and low 
savings rates, had led most societies to accumulate substantial liquid assets.  At this 
date about one-quarter  of  the  CPBS‟s  deposits  was  provided  by  the  co-operative 
movement  (Cassell,  1984,  p.  86).  Further  growth  followed  the  1951  return  of  a 
Conservative government, more sympathetic to private home ownership. 
Building  society  advances  grew  from  27  per  cent  of  total  mortgage 
transactions in 1920 to 38 per cent in 1936, to 50 per cent in 1958 (Cleary, 1965, p. 
282).    Growth  among  the  societies  was  uneven.    By  1958,  the  top  five  societies 
accounted  for  £1.029  billion  in  assets,  43  per  cent  of  the  total  assets  for  all  755 
societies,
13 and were growing at double the rate of those of  all other societies.  Most 
of this growth was organic, with little due to amalgamations with smaller societies, as 
the larger societies appear to have been more effective at capturing market share in 
the expanding retail mortgage market (Bátiz-Lazo and Billings, 2007).  The largest 
five societies plus the Alliance Building Society maintained annual average growth in 
mortgage assets of 13 per cent per year from 1950 to 1967 (Table 2, Panel A), during 
which time mortgage assets averaged 83 per cent of total assets of these societies. 
 [Insert Table 2 around here]   13 
  Growth in the CPBS‟s mortgage assets during the 1950s exceeded the average for 
the top five societies (Cassell, 1984, p. 72; Table 2, Panel B).  It peaked at 24 per cent 
in 1958, when the CPBS amalgamated with the Scottish Amicable Building Society 
(SABS), the largest Scottish society, which had assets of £22.5 million and 42,658 
shareholders  (14  per  cent  and  11  per  cent  of  those  of  the  combined  entity 
respectively).  After yields on gilt-edged securities reached 7 per cent in September 
1957, the SABS‟s  reserves  of £997,792 at  December 1957  were  exceeded by the 
unrealized  loss  of  £1.5  million  on  its  investment  holdings.
14  Deposit withdrawal 
notices followed publication of these figures,  and amounted to £2.5 million by 23 
April 1958, but most were cancelled after the merger was announced.
15 
Even before the SABS amalgamation, the CPBS had drawn the attention of 
managers of the Woolwich Equitable (WEBS), who appeared to believe that its 
capital position was under pressure and that non-recurring items flattered profits:  
The  General  Manager  submitted orally  to  the  Board a  report on  certain 
features of the Annual Report of the Co -operative Permanent Society for 
1957.  Reference was made, inter alia, to the small revenue surplus for the 
year, the low reserve ratio and an increase over   the year in the extent of 
appreciation of Stock Exchange Securities shown in the Balance Sheet which 
apparently arose from investment transactions during the year, including the 
taking into the Profit of a capital surplus of £262,170 on investments realis ed 
during the year.
16 
  WEBS directors returned to this theme a few months later, suggesting that the 
combination of organic growth and absorption of small societies had stretched the 
CPBS when they:   14 
noted  that  since  1939  [to  1957,  the]  transfers  of  engagements  to  the  Co-
operative Permanent had amounted to £6.1m (including £3.6m of the Exeter 
Benefit  [1956]  ),  compared  to  £294,000  for  Halifax  and  £220,000  for 
Woolwich.  There has been a marked rise in the management expenses ratio of 
the Co-operative Society over the period …
17 
Soon  after  the  SABS  amalgamation  the  CPBS  was  involved  in  a  public 
exchange during its bid for the Sheerness and Gillingham Society, the sector‟s first-
ever contested amalgamation.
18  After H. V. Wiles, chairman of the Hastings  and 
Thanet Society, the original bidder, questioned publicly whether the CPBS, then the 
third largest society in terms of assets, would achieve trustee investment status, t he 
CPBS responded that it „would qualify for trustee status within the set time‟.
19 W.W. 
Wetherhill, general manager of the Hastings ,  considered  the  CPBS‟s  intervention 
„unsolicited  and  unwarranted‟,  but  Herbert  Ashworth,  CPBS  general  manager, 
declared that it „was justified by the strong reserve position and the well spread assets 
of the Sheerness society‟.
20  After the  Leek and Moorlands (LMBS) also made an 
offer for the Sheerness, the Hastings raise d its offer and won control over the £3  
million in total assets and 8,000 members.
21 
The Importance of Capital and Trustee Investment Status in Building Societies 
How then did this period of high growth affect societies‟ reserve ratios?  From 
1959 to 1967 „gross‟ reserve ratios averaged 3.8 per cent and „net‟ reserve ratios (i.e. 
after adjusting for unrealized profits or losses on investments) averaged 3.5 per cent 
for the top five societies and the Alliance (Table 1).  The net reserve ratios for the 
Alliance (2.5 per cent in 1959 and 2.9 per cent in 1960) and the CPBS (2.3 per cent in 
1959 and 2.7 per cent in 1960) stand out as relatively weak (Table 1, Panel B).  Assets   15 
of these societies had grown particularly rapidly between 1950 and 1958 (Alliance: 
128 per cent and CPBS: 166 per cent - Table 2, Panel B). These two, and the smaller 
LMBS, had enjoyed high rates of asset growth since 1945 (Cleary, 1965, p. 252).  The 
BSA60  was  enacted  in  June  1960  and  at  the  CPBS‟s  financial  year  end  on  31 
December its reserves ratios remained below those of other large societies (Table 1).  
The CPBS‟s directors were closely associated with the virtues of an „adequate‟ 
level of reserves.  C.J. Dunham, CPBS‟s President from 1959 and a BSA Council 
member since 1950, became BSA Chairman in 1961.
22 Close links between the BSA 
Council and the CPBS dated from the appointment of Arthur Webb, then CPBS‟s 
Secretary, to the BSA Executive in 1903. Webb joined the CPBS in 1892 (when total 
assets were £25,000), became managing director in 1928 (when total assets were £7 
million), Chairman in 1939 (when total assets were £30 million) and retired from the 
BSA Executive in 1946 and the CPBS Board in 1951 (when total assets were £66 
million).  Webb „constantly urged the desirability of societies maintaining a 10 per 
cent reserve fund, and whenever he spoke his views merited attention‟ (Price, 1959, p. 
381).  The CPBS was among the first societies to be granted trustee investment status 
in  June  1959  and  for  reputational  reasons  the  CPBS‟s  directors  would  have  been 
reluctant  to  put  at  risk  this  status,  which  was  dependent  on  maintenance  of  a 
satisfactory capital position and perceived as a hallmark of prestige as well as giving 
potential  for  competitive  advantage.    Loss  of  such  status  would  have  foreclosed 
growth opportunities and been regarded as a strong negative signal on the Society‟s 
management capabilities. 
Other  societies  also  associated  themselves  with  the  importance  of  strong 
reserve ratios.  In the mid-1950s the Halifax, the largest society, experienced internal 
conflict over the issue, which cost it growth to the benefit of other societies, and led to   16 
that society‟s temporary departure from the BSA (Barrow, 2006, pp. 38-49).  The 
Halifax‟s conservative attitude to reserves and liquidity was long-standing (Hobson, 
1953, pp. 129-130; Barrow, 2006, pp. 23-24).  Societies such as the Bristol and West 
had traditionally placed a high priority „on the maintenance of healthy reserve and 
liquidity ratios, and there was never any question that growth would be allowed to 
diminish either‟ (Harvey, 1988, p. 258). 
In his annual report for 1960 the CRFS attempted to raise awareness among 
depositors and the general public of the good business and sound financial standing of 
designated  societies,  cautioning  investors  to  guard  against  societies  „of  doubtful 
financial standing, and ... to enquire whether [a society] has been designated as one in 
which trustees may deposit trust funds‟.
23  The challenge for the CPBS was clear and 
the following section details its responses. 
 
THE CPBS‟S RESPONSE TO THE HOUSING AND HOUSE PURCHASE ACT 
1959 
 
Controlled Growth, 1959-63 
By  1959  the  Society‟s  directors  had  decided  to  curb  its  expansion.    A  policy  of 
restraint was announced at that year‟s Annual General Meeting and reported in the 
Building Societies Gazette: „In presenting the society‟s remarkable figures for 1958 - 
total  assets  have  now  reached  £204,522,500  -  it  was  emphasised  [by  Dunham, 
deputising  for  H.L.  Score,  the  President]  that  the  society‟s  policy  was  one  of 
controlled expansion‟.
24  The significance of the new policy was  evident to some   17 
observers: „The Co-operative must build up its  reserves, for it would not wish to 
jeopardise the prospect of trustee status under the government‟s housing bill.‟
25 
  The period of controlled growth was initially expected to last a couple of years,
26 
but the need to maintain trustee investment status required that it continue for longer 
than anticipated.  The CPBS relaxed its period of restraint in 1963 , when annual 
growth of mortgage assets returned to double-digit rates and the net reserve ratio rose, 
to remain well above 3 per cent.  Several measures had been taken during this period: 
branch network expansion was halted; a £500 ceiling was imposed on new advances, 
at a time when the average mortgage loan in the U.K. was £1,112, virtually the same 
as the CPBS‟s own average loan of £1,139 (RFS, 1961, p. 2; CPBS Annual Return, 31 
December 1960); and the flow of new business and commission payments was curbed 
by terminating the contracts of more than 1,000 agents.  Branch numbers fell a little 
from 119 in 1958, only climbing back to 120 in 1964 (Cassell, 1984, p. 121).  A major 
review of strategy found that half of the 1,159 remaining agencies in 1963 generated 
deposits  amounting  to  less  than  £2,000.  The  Society  replaced  those  agents  with 
employees and moved to a branch structure wherever possible (Cassell, 1984, pp. 82-
3).
27  The success of the self-restraint policy was reflected in mortgage asset growth of 
158 per cent between 1958 and 1967  for the CPBS, compared to an average for the 
major societies of 208 per cent (Table 2, Panel B). 
Improving the Reserves Ratio, 1960 
The longer-term success of the controlled growth policy was not  assured in 1960 
when  the  Society‟s  directors  concluded  that  it  might  be  insufficient  to  allow  the 
reserve requirement to be met.  The result was that the Revenue and Appropriation 
Account for 1960 showed three items which lifted the net reserves ratio: the sale and 
leaseback of a property involving a related party, changes in the basis of depreciation,   18 
and the release of a taxation provision.  We now describe these three areas in turn and 
in the next section discuss them in greater detail. 
  A „Surplus on the sale of premises‟ of £424,484 was recorded in a transaction 
with the Co-operative Insurance Society (CIS), whereby the CPBS sold and leased 
back its head office (New Oxford House) and eight retail branch premises, all of 
which „stood in the books below their present worth‟.
28  These freehold properties 
were transferred to the CIS for £500,000 and the CPBS entered into a 99 year 
agreement to lease them back, with the option to repurchase at no more than 10 per 
cent above the sale price.  The freehold of the head office was, indeed, bought back 
after a short interval  (Cassell, 1984, p. 80) .
29  The second item  recorded in the 
Revenue and Appropriation Account  was a drop of £71,288 in the  total charge for 
depreciation and the third item was the transfer to the Society‟s General Reserve of a 
balance of £255,716 described as an „Amount set aside for Future Taxation‟.  The 
Finance Committee: 
had been impressed by the argument that if the whole of the £53,145 required 
by the depreciation formula were provided, it would no longer be possible for 
the society to give an assurance that a net reserve ratio of 2.5 per cent would 
have  been  attained  whether  or  not  New  Oxford  House  had  been  sold  or, 
alternatively, whether or not the basis of provision for income tax had been 
changed. They had therefore reached the conclusion that is was desirable for 
all adjustments already agreed by the Board to be made so that the accounts 
would indicate a net reserve ratio of 2.677 per cent. 
[The Board were advised, however, that] since the Committee had considered 
the accounts, the Auditors had decided that it would be necessary for a note to 
appear on the Revenue and Appropriation Account if no depreciation were   19 
provided on freehold premises in 1960. The Board was informed that, if an 
amount of up to £13,000 were provided on freehold premises, the note would 
not be needed, and it would still be possible to give the assurance mentioned 
above.
30 
   
  The Minutes of the Board and of the Finance Committee detailed  neither the 
depreciation  formula  nor  the  calculations  supporting  the  difference  between  the 
£53,145 required by the  formula, the £13,000 charge acceptable to the auditors, and 
the actual charge for depreciation on premises of £24,254 shown in the Form A.R. 11 
for 1960. 
 The combined effect of these three measures was to raise the net reserve ratio 
of the CPBS to 2.7 per cent in 1960 (Table 1, Panel B), above the required minimum 
of 2.5 per cent.  These  actions  proved timely, as c ontinued growth  in  mortgage 
advances for the movement as a whole after 1959 -60 reduced the reserve ratios of 
many societies, although not for the largest, all of whose net reserve ratios remained 
above 3 per cent (Table 1, Panel B).  By 1963 some other societies were near the point 
of having to decide between continued growth and loss of trustee investment status or 
maintenance of  this  status  with slower growth  (Cleary, 1965, p.  258), a dilemma 





Creative Accounting at the CPBS   20 
The definition of „creative accounting‟ is much debated.  Clarke et al. (2003, pp. 25-
31),  for  example,  stress  the  inadequacies  of  contemporary  GAAP  with  particular 
reference to the Australian context.  The parallel with this case is the ease with which 
the  CPBS  was  able  to  shift  from  a  position  of  likely  non-compliance  with  the 
regulatory  requirements  to  compliance,  suggesting  that  prevailing  GAAP  were 
sufficiently loose to allow a wide range of accounting outcomes.  Alternatively this 
may imply that the CPBS‟s creative accounting was not unusual, but we have found 
no  evidence  to  support  this  view,  and  will  argue  that  the  environment  in  which 
building  societies  operated  created  strong  incentives  for  all  parties  to  accept  the 
CPBS‟s situation. 
Accounting literature distinguishes between „real‟ and „accruals‟  aspects of 
creative  accounting  i.e.  decisions  reflecting  economic  decisions  (such  as  cutting 
discretionary  expenditure  or  changing  the  timing  of  particular  transactions)  and 
accounting  decisions  (e.g.,  relating  to  depreciation  or  provisioning)  (Stolowy  and 
Breton, 2004, p. 24).  In the CPBS‟s case, the three main elements, with both real and 
accruals aspects, allowed the Society to report an improved capital position. 
The Property Sale and Leaseback 
This  transaction  had  most  significant  immediate  impact  on  the  capital  ratio, 
generating a £424,000 surplus compared to the £71,000 total reduction in the annual 
depreciation charge, but the latter would have had a significant cumulative impact 
over time.  The counterparty to the transaction, the CIS, was owned jointly by the Co-
operative Wholesale Society and the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society, both of 
whom nominated representatives to the CPBS‟s board from the mid-1940s to the mid-
1960s (Cassell, 1984, pp. 65 and 86).   21 
The interpretation of this transaction most favourable to the CPBS is that it 
was able to crystallize a rise in property values without losing control of the properties 
concerned, when it was known that a straightforward revaluation would have been 
unacceptable.    This  might  be  considered  reasonable  had  the  transaction  been 
undertaken on „arms-length‟ terms i.e. the price paid by the CIS was that which an 
independent buyer would have paid and the leaseback rentals were at a market level.  
Unfortunately, the available evidence does not allow us to say whether this was the 
case.  A  less  favourable  interpretation  is  that  the  transaction  simply  represented 
„warehousing‟ of these assets with a related party  until the CPBS was in a position to 
exercise the buy-back option.  However interpreted, this was an unusual transaction - 
we have not found evidence of any comparable transaction among the larger societies, 
but, unlike the CPBS, they did not need such a transaction.  The CPBS was also 
unusual in that its roots in the co-operative movement provided a natural counterparty. 
Fixed Asset Reporting and Depreciation 
It  is  not  possible to  judge what  an appropriate depreciation charge for the 
CPBS  would  have  been  -  to  do  so  would  require  detail  of  the  composition  and 
condition of fixed assets, for example the balance between freehold and leasehold 
properties  and  the  maintenance  or  obsolescence  of  equipment.    We  examined  the 
Forms A.R. 11 for the big six societies and the LMBS for the ten years to 1960.  
Analyses of fixed asset totals and depreciation charges are either not provided at all in 
the Forms A.R. 11, or, if provided, on bases which are not obviously comparable 
across the different societies, but it is possible to make some comparisons over time 
and across societies.  Table 3 shows the societies‟ effective depreciation rates and 
reveals considerable variations from society to society, and from year to year for some 
societies.    The  Halifax  depreciation  charges  were  round  sum  figures,  typically   22 
£50,000 per year.  The Leeds Permanent charged no depreciation, but in the years 
1958-60 recorded significant expenses for „re-equipping and renovating head office 
and branches‟ and in the years 1959 and 1960 expensed motor vehicles - we treat 
these items as „depreciation‟ in the table.  In keeping with its cautious attitudes, the 
Halifax‟s depreciation policy appears relatively conservative. 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
These findings imply that there was little consensus on depreciation among 
large societies.  The CPBS‟s changed treatment of depreciation, although material in 
its overall impact on the financial statements, was arguably not out of line with the 
practice of other societies, and indeed more conservative than some.  The CPBS‟s 
depreciation charge in 1959 appears to have been relatively high by comparison to 
other major societies and also its own recent standards, so the reduced charge in 1960 
could be argued to have aligned it more closely with other societies. 
In deciding the charge for depreciation the CPBS‟s directors were also acting 
upon  the  advice  of  the  auditors,  and  the  Board  Minutes  of  19  January  1961 
32  
suggested that the auditors had discussed fully the question of depreciation, and thus 
auditors and directors could therefore claim that the working lives of the buildings had 
been properly assessed and that „… correct principles had been acted upon, and that 
the provision made in the accounts appears to be reasonable and sufficient‟ (de Paula, 
1957, p. 99).  The depreciation decision could also have been defended on the grounds 
of  materiality  in  the  overall  context  of  the  financial  statements.  With  reserves  of 
£6,418,160  and  „Office  Premises  and  Equipment‟  of  £3,683,959  in  1959,  the 
difference between the £13,000 charged and the £53,145 required by the depreciation 
formula could be regarded as immaterial.     23 
Directors and auditors could argue that they followed „best practice‟ in 1960 
(as described by de Paula, 1957, pp. 98 and 145), as depreciation was charged on 
freehold  properties,  albeit  a  lower  amount  than  previously.  Faced  with  the 
impossibility  of  estimating  the  working  life  of  fixed  assets  that  were  actively 
maintained, and largely ignoring the ICAEW‟s Recommendations IX and VX, the 
joint-stock clearing banks, with their much larger high street branch networks, chose 
not to depreciate freehold property at all (Capie and Billings, 2001, p. 238). Perks 
(1977, pp. 177-81) claims the situation was similar at building societies in the early 
1970s.  Pack (1959) argued that, as building societies were subject „to the burden of a 
true and fair view‟ (p. 864), they should revalue office premises annually.  But the 
CRFS had signalled his unwillingness to accept revaluations of premises and it was 
not established practice among financial institutions - the first revaluation among the 
major banks did not occur until 1964 (Capie and Billings, 2001, p. 248). 
Overall, we conclude that, in exercising discretion in changing depreciation 
policy, the CPBS changed an aspect of its financial statements in which: a) „best 
practice‟ was not well-established; b) disclosures were variable; c) the Society had 
appeared previously to make greater provision for depreciation than some other large 
societies; and d) it would be difficult for the auditors to form a judgement as to the 
appropriateness of the charge made. 
Taxation 
The  uncertainties  associated  with  taxation  have  contributed  to  creative 
accounting in other organisations (see e.g., Arnold, 1991, and Napier, 1990).  The tax 
reserve „Amount set aside for Future Taxation‟ was identified as a pre-printed caption 
on the Form A.R. 11 only in the years 1959 and 1960 and appears to relate to changes 
in the basis of Income Tax in 1958.  Other specific taxation provisions shown in the   24 
Form  were  for  Income  Tax  and  Profits  Tax.  We  examined  the  other  societies‟ 
balances on this reserve at the end of 1959 and 1960.  For four of these (Alliance, 
Abbey, LMBS, WEBS), the balance was nil in both  years.  Halifax  had year-end 
balances of £770,000 and nil in 1959 and 1960 respectively and Leeds Permanent 
£763,000  and  £892,500  in  these  two  years.    Although  the  CPBS‟s  capital  ratio 
benefited from release of this reserve, its elimination was not obviously out of line 
with the treatment of other major societies. 
Creative Accounting in Other Societies 
We  do  not  claim  that  the  CPBS  was  alone  in  its  practice  of  creative 
accounting, although our examination of the Forms A.R. 11 of the major societies 
revealed  no  apparently  obvious  examples.    But  some  transactions  relating  to 
investments could be considered to represent earnings management.  Some societies 
recorded significant realized profits on investments and write-downs of investment 
values in various years.  The timing of investment disposals could represent „real‟ 
earnings  management  and  the  write-downs  „accruals‟  earnings  management,  with 
both classes of transaction at the discretion of management. 
Acceptance of the CPBS’s Creative Accounting 
In  the  case  of  the  CPBS  creative  accounting  achieved  its  objective  -  the 
desired  regulatory  status  was  maintained.    There  was  clear  intent  to  use  specific 
changes in accounting practice or particular transactions to ensure compliance with 
the capital requirements, but the question remains why this failed to attract public 
attention or criticism. 
We have noted that the CPBS‟s financial weakness had been recognized by at 
least one other major society, but none of these societies made public comment on the   25 
CPBS‟s difficulties, although the  Hastings society had criticized the CPBS in  the 
context  of  the  battle  for  the  Sheerness.    Given  the  nature  of  the  movement  it  is 
unlikely that other major societies would have believed they could have gained from 
publicly discrediting the CPBS.  The societies had struggled to secure the prize of 
trustee  investment  status.    The  failure  of  one  of  the  largest  societies  to  meet  the 
requirements for this would have been damaging for the movement as a whole and 
arguably would have discredited the new regulation.  From a commercial point of 
view, other societies may have judged it better to have a weak competitor, which, 
indeed, conceded growth to them during its period of controlled expansion,  rather 
than to shake confidence in the movement. 
The movement has had a long-standing tradition for the rescue of societies 
suffering  from  financial  weakness  or  scandal  by  merger  with  larger  societies.
33  
During  the  1950s  the  CPBS  had  „rescued‟  two  societies,  the  substantial  SABS, 
seventeenth largest society (BSA Yearbook 1957), and the much small Exeter Benefit 
(with assets of £3.4 million versus the CPBS‟s £123.4 million at the end of 1955).  
But at the end of 1960 the CPBS was the third largest society, and there would have 
been considerable obstacles to its merger with another large society - its financial 
position, the co-operative movement links and issues such as the overlap of branch 
networks and dealing with the large number of agents.  To have drawn attention to the 
problems of a society „too big to fail‟ would have created real difficulties for the 
movement. 
In the absence of documentary evidence we are obliged to speculate as to why 
the  CPBS‟s  creative  accounting  did  not  attract  the  attention  of  the  regulator 
responsible for the protection of shareholders and other depositors.  It is possible that 
the measures taken by the CPBS were accepted by the CRFS as a „quid pro quo‟ for   26 
the  CPBS‟s  rescues  of  the  SABS  and  the  Exeter.    There  would  also  have  been 
embarrassment for the CRFS in criticising the CPBS, or even withdrawing its trustee 
investment status so soon after it was granted.  An extreme outcome could have been 
a  „run‟  on  the  Society,  which  would  not  have  benefited  the  regulator  or  other 
societies, and undermined the new regulatory regime and discredited the movement.  
This  could  have  led  to  disruption  of  the  provision  of  mortgage  finance  and  the 
housing market, and possible damage to the co-operative movement.  The CRFS may 
therefore have hoped for the outcome that transpired - that the procedures adopted by 
the CPBS would allow it to „buy time‟, and coupled with the slowdown in its asset 
growth, the Society was able to improve its reserves ratio. 
Possible Audit Report Qualification and the Auditors’ Relationship with the CPBS 
The question arises as to whether the auditors‟ report on CPBS should have 
been qualified. Prior to the regulatory changes in 1959-60, auditors would qualify 
building society accounts based only on evidence of fraud or deceit, that is, when 
there  were  specific  transactions  relating  to  wealth  transfers  between  stakeholders 
outside the letter of the law. The BSA60 required auditors of building societies to 
state, by way of a note to the Revenue and Appropriation Account or a letter to the 
CRFS, any items affected in every material respect by either (a) transactions of an 
exceptional or non-recurrent nature; or (b) by any change in the basis of accounting.
34 
Financial reports (i.e. Forms A.R. 11) of the top five building societies  in the period 
1951 to  1970 were often accompanied by notes or letters r egarding extraordinary 
matters,  but  none  criticised  or  otherwise  disagreed  with  the  directors  of  these 
societies.    We have  already noted the  wide variations in the practices of  asset 
depreciation in financial institutions, and it is debatable whether auditors of building   27 
societies  might  have  been  expected  to  draw  attention  to  changes  in  depreciation 
formulae. 
In this period: „Societies were audited by local accountants with whom they 
had  connections  and  a  relationship  of  trust‟.
35  The  Society‟s  auditors  were  both 
partners  in  the  firm  Edward  Myers,  Clark  &  Co.,  which  continued  to  provide  its 
auditors until after 1970.
36  By 1960 the auditors had known the Society for some 
years and would have been aware of  the integrity of the Board and of the long-term 
steps already taken to reduce growth to allow capital reserves to build up to  ensure 
compliance with the minimum net reserve requirement.   
Audit fees were not separately disclosed in the Annual Returns, so it is not 
possible to comment on fee dependency, but la ter evidence suggests that audit fees 
were a very small proportion of total management expenses  (Perks, 1977, pp. 111-
112). Nor do we have any evidence as to whether the auditors undertook other types 
of business for the CPBS which may have exposed them to conflicts of interest.
37    
It  is  unclear  whether  qualifications  resulting  from  doubtful  depreciation 
practices were widespread or whether such qualifications would have been regarded 
as serious.   Kettle  (1954b, p.  277)  cites  an  auditor‟s  report  describing  improper 
depreciation  of  fixed  assets  as  an  exemplar  of  the  consequences  of  obscure 
qualifications  and  empirical  evidence  has  shown  mixed  results  depending  on  the 
nature of the qualification and whether or not it was anticipated (Ball et al., 1979, p. 
27; Clinch, 1983, p. 143; Craswell, 1986, p. 32). Inconsistencies in the requirements 
of paragraphs 3 and 4 of Schedule Nine of the CA48 were identified as sources of 
difficulty  in  distinguishing  auditors‟  comments  (i.e.  amplifications)  from  outright 
qualifications (Kettle, 1954a, p. 250).   28 
 Auditor performance must be interpreted in its historical context and this case 
arose in a period before the development of comprehensive auditing guidelines and 
standards.  The CPBS‟s auditors were in a difficult position and would have had to 
rely heavily on their judgement in forming their opinion.  There was a new audit 
regime, the ICAEW‟s guidance on building society audits did not address the aspects 
at  issue,  and  the  ICAEW‟s  Recommendations  on  Accounting  Principles  and  the 
BSA‟s  guidelines  were  not  binding  and  had  failed  to  produce  uniformity  among 
societies or other financial institutions.  The concept of materiality, although explicitly 
recognized  by  auditors  in  the  1950s,  remained  ill-defined,  not  featuring  in  audit 




This article has taken an historical perspective to analyse managerial discretion in 
financial services organizations in the context of a changing regulatory environment 
by combining secondary sources with original archival material.   The case of the 
CPBS  highlights  problems  in  accounting  for  fixed  assets,  materiality  and,  more 
generally, the nature of the audience for financial statements and to whom auditors are 
accountable. The case offers unusual insight into accounting practice where there was 
a  material  effect  on  the  reported  position  of  a  financial  intermediary,  where 
accounting for fixed assets had been a minor consideration. 
This paper is not a comprehensive study of financial reporting practices among 
building societies, but the CPBS case does not appear to be representative of creative 
accounting amongst other large building societies.
38  But there is perhaps some irony   29 
that  a  mutual  building  society  should  have  used  techniques  of  accounting 
manipulation  given  the  apparent  nostalgia  with  which  such  institutions  have  been 
viewed in the current financial crisis.  However, we have shown how, as in other 
sectors, financial reporting interacts with the external environment.  We have also 
extended the creative accounting literature by demonstrating that practice varied in 
important areas of financial reporting in the relatively neglected mutual sector, outside 
the  CA48  reporting  framework,  and  that  this  provided  opportunities  for  creative 
accounting.  A notable difference between this and other British cases of creative 
accounting is the association of lack of transparency and creative accounting with the 
use of hidden reserves.  This was true in companies generally before CA48, and until 
at least 1970 in banking, but the CPBS case was relatively transparent and involved 
no use of hidden reserves. 
The motivations for accounting manipulation in this case do not fall wholly 
conveniently within usual classifications.  In Stolowy and Breton‟s framework the 
target of manipulation was a regulatory ratio to prevent a loss of status which would 
not have benefited „shareholders‟ or other depositors due to the absence of equity 
shareholders.  The  sale  and  leaseback  related  party  transaction  and  depreciation 
changes appear to have been designed to overcome the inability to use revaluation to 
improve  the  regulatory  ratio.    These  fall  into  Stolowy  and  Breton‟s  category  of 
„specially-designed transactions‟ (2004, p. 12), as well as the practices discussed by  
Clarke et al. (2003, p. 31).  Another perspective is to place the case in the context of 
Clinch‟s  „bond  covenant  hypothesis‟  (1983,  p.  141).  This  view  suggests  that 
covenants will affect management choice of accounting methods since managers will 
seek  to  avoid  the  costs  of  violating  restrictions.  Such  costs  may  relate  to  the 
renegotiation of a debt contract, possible bankruptcy arising from technical default,   30 
or,  in  this  instance,  the  costs  which  would  likely  have  arisen  from  the  loss  of  a 
particular regulatory status, that of being eligible for investments by trustees.  
The  case  also  highlights  difficulties  in  interpreting  problems  in  a  service 
business. If a firm in a sector such as manufacturing, transport or mining faced a 
situation of excessive growth, management‟s shortcomings would become evident as 
either inventory would grow, plant would remain idle, fixed assets would be poorly 
maintained  or  replaced  at  the  wrong  time  and  the  audit  fee  would  increase 
substantially. In a service firm stakeholders are obliged to place greater reliance on 
the  financial  accounts  and  hence  consistency  and  transparency  are  important. 
Financial  intermediaries  can  signal  that  there  might  be  problems  ahead  by,  for 
example, changes in provisions or in dividend policies.  The CPBS signalled the end 
of a period of high growth and the start of one of consolidation, but did not articulate 
fully the implications of this change. 
A broader implication of the article is that during the 1950s and early 1960s, 
directors  of  building  societies,  and  perhaps  even  banks,  had  limited  regard  for 
financial considerations when making expansion and capital expenditure decisions. 
But accounting for fixed assets was to become much more important to the history of 
financial  service  organizations  because  „tax  policy  and  depreciation  profoundly 
influenced  the  timing  of  when  companies  acquired  large  computers,  which  were 
capital-intensive  investments‟  (Cortada,  2004,  p.  23).    This  indicates  that  future 
studies  on  capital-intensive  investments  in  U.K.  retail  finance  (such  as 
computerization and retail branch network expansion in the 1960s and 1970s) will 
need to explore the interaction between strategic and financial considerations in the 
selection  and  timing  of  those  investments.  31 
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TABLE 1 
GROSS AND NET RESERVES, 1950-67, SELECTED YEARS 
Year  Abbey  Alliance Co-operative  Leeds  Woolwich  Halifax 
 
Average 
  National    Permanent  Permanent  Equitable     
               
Panel A - Gross Reserves = Total reserves / total assets % 
               
1950  5.4  2.2  4.6  6.7  5.4  5.8  5.0 
1955  3.9  2.1  3.2  5.3  4.2  4.5  3.9 
1958  3.6  2.7  2.7  5.1  4.3  3.5  3.6 
1959  3.7  3.1  2.9  5.2  4.3  3.6  3.8 
1960  3.6  3.5  3.4  5.4  4.0  3.5  3.9 
               
 Average 
1959-67 
3.5  3.3  3.3  5.0  3.8  3.6  3.8 
               
Panel B - Net reserves / net total assets % 
               
1959  3.6  2.5  2.3  5.2  3.2  3.6  3.4 
1960  3.2  2.9  2.7  5.2  2.9  3.5  3.4 
Average 
 1959-67  3.4  3.0  3.1  4.7  3.4  3.6  3.5 
 
Panel C - Other information 
               
Established  1944  1863  1884  1848  1847  1853  1857 





1948  1959  1952  1961  1948  1937  1951 
 
Source: Building Societies Yearbook, 1950 to 1968 and authors‟ calculations. 
Note: Financial year-ends: Leeds Permanent and Woolwich Equitable: 30 September; 
Abbey National, Alliance, Co-operative Permanent: 31 December; and Halifax: 31   38 
January. Abridged balance sheets were reported in the Building Societies Yearbook 
published in the following June, that is, the same year in which the Halifax closed its 
books.  The Abbey National was created in 1944 through the union of two large and 




ASSET GROWTH AT THE MAJOR BUILDING SOCIETIES, 1950-67 
Year   Abbey   Alliance  Co-operative  Leeds  Woolwich  Halifax  Average 
    National      Permanent  Permanent  Equitable       
               
Panel A – Mortgage asset growth per year (%) 
               
Average  12.7  14.5  12.5  12.2  11.4  14.2  12.9 
               
Panel B - Cumulative mortgage asset growth, various periods (%) 
               
1950-1967  568  730  585  448  442  534  551 
1950-1958  108  128  166  92  87  91  112 
1958-1967  221  263  158  185  190  231  208 
1960-1965  53  69  37  50  52  55  53 
               
Source: as Table 1. 
  
TABLE 3 
EFFECTIVE DEPRECIATION RATES (%), 1951-60 
Year  Abbey 
National 
Alliance  Co-operative 
Permanent 






Minimum  Maximum  Unweighted 
average 
1951  2.18  2.75  2.84  10.19  0  2.49  0.98  0  10.19  3.06 
1952  2.11  3.23  3.83  9.99  0  2.66  1.91  0  9.99  3.39 
1953  2.19  3.22  3.15  9.13  0  4.42  2.45  0  9.13  3.51 
1954  2.42  2.51  2.75  7.72  0  3.18  2.18  0  7.72  2.97 
1955  2.85  2.13  3.31  6.89  0  2.38  2.29  0  6.89  2.84 
1956  2.81  2.16  3.32  6.40  0  2.57  2.88  0  6.40  2.88 
1957  2.55  1.36  3.20  5.42  0  1.89  3.03  0  5.42  2.49 
1958  3.31  1.20  3.19  n/a  7.87  2.99  2.47  1.20  7.87  3.50 
1959  2.98  1.24  4.11  9.23  6.09  2.39  3.48  1.24  9.23  4.22 
1960  3.06  0.97  2.24  3.97  4.88  2.80  3.18  0.97  4.88  3.01 
Average  2.64  2.08  3.19  7.66  1.88  2.78  2.49  1.88  7.66  3.25 
Source: authors‟ calculations from TNA, Forms A.R. 11. 
Note: The effective depreciation rate is expressed as a percentage, and calculated as the total charge for depreciation shown in the Revenue and 
Appropriation Account divided by the total year-end net book value for fixed assets shown in the Balance Sheet.  Year-end dates are as shown in 
Table 1.  n/a = Form A.R. 11 missing for this year.  
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